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Prying Open the Cleftl 
Orin Percus 
MIT 
This paper argues that the oven structure of clefts conceals a subject that is a definite 
description. It argues that an analysis of clefts that incorporates concealed defmite 
descriptions explains a nwnber of otherwise puzzling semantic properties that the cleft 
exhibits. The proposal is that the derivation of a cleft proceeds as in (1); I give a particular 
example in (2). The derivation of a cleft of the general form in (l/2a) includes a structure 
like that in (l/2b), a copular sentence where the subject is a description that contains a 
definite determiner and a null head. Two operations are imponant in its derivation: the 
extraposition of the relative, shown in ( l/2c), and the morphological spell-out as it of the 
DP containing the definite dete�iner and the CP trace, shown in (112d). 2, 3, 4 
(1) a. It is [a]p that has propeny II. 
b. [n. [op the 0 [cp OP; that li has propeny II ]  ]j [ VP ti is a] ] 
c. Extraposition 
[ liP loP thU o tt li [ VP t; � lf l 1 [cp OP; �at t; has propeny II lt 1 
d. It is a that ... 
Spell-Out: (op the 0 t1c ] � It 
1J wish to thank Noam Chomsky, Michel DeGraff, Kai von Fintel, Danny Fox, Irene Heim, David McKay 
and David Pesetsky for very valuable suggestions and comments. Although I have discovered that the ¥eneral line of analysis is by no means original, I still think that aspects of its implementation are timely. 
For now, being largely ignorant of its properties, I am being noncommittal about where the extraposition 
takes place. If as a displacement process it has little in common with other displacement processes 
previous to spell-out, it may be more appropriate to treat it as purely a PF phenomenon. Given the 
arguments in this paper that a definite description with the CP its restrictor is present at the level of 
interpretation, it is natural to think that, if the displacement occurs before spell-out, the displaced 
constituent is reconstructed by the time the sentence is interpreted. 
3The VP structure sketched in the diagram is a considerable simplification if the analysis in Section ill of 
the paper is correct. 
4nte lexical items given here in the representation of the base structures should not be taken too literally. 
As the final step in the derivation of clefts suggests, the lexical material might better be represented as 
feature bundles, which are spelled out in whatever way is consistent with the workings of the spell-out 
componenL 
C 1997 by Orin Percus 
K. Kusumoto (ed.), NELS 27, 337-351 
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(2) a. It is [JOHN]F that Mary saw. 
b. liP [op the 0 (cp OPi that Mary saw t; ) )j [yp � is John ] ] 
c. Extraposition 
[ IJ:p [op th� 0 tk ]j (yp � � J�hn ] ] [cp OPi th;t Mft'"Y sUw t; lk ]  
d. It is John that Mary saw 
Spell-Out: (op the 0 tJ< )  � It 
(3) IP 
� 
DP· VP A � is John 
/':>.. NP CP 




The interpretation of the null head for the purposes of the example here is the same as the 
interpretation of one - it is a predicate that holds of all entities of some type or other. The 
basic claim, then, is that a sentence like (2a) is equivalent to a sentence like (4), and that 
this equivalence follows from the fact that the sentences are structurally indistinguishable. 
(4) The one that Mary saw is [JOHN]F. 
In this paper, I give evidence not only for the structure that I assume underlies the 
cleft, but also for the operations of extraposition and spell-out that occur during its 
derivation. Of course, if a structure like the one in ( l/2b) does underlie a cleft like the one 
in ( l/2a), some process has to displace the CP, so there is evidence for extraposition just 
given the base structure I argue for. However, I further suggest that independently 
motivated constraints on extraposition can be seen to apply in the cleft. I also suggest that 
there is independent use for the peculiar spell-out rule in (112d). 
The major properties of the clefts that the proposal here seeks to account for are the 
following: 
i. Its presuppositions. A cleft of the form It is [ a]F that has property II has the same 
presuppositions as a sentence containing the definite description the individual that has 
property II This is explained on the analysis presented here: the cleft contains just such a 
definite description. 
ii. Its specificational character.s The DPs that constitute the head of a cleft (the 
phrase following the copula) are constrained in their discourse function. They are 
constrained in precisely the same way that the postcopular DPs in so-called inverse copular 
sentences (Moro 1990, Heycock 1991) are. The claim here is that the copular sentence 
from which extraposition takes place must be an inverse copular sentence. Given a certain 
SThe literarure on clefts and (especially) pseudo-clefts draws a distinction between specificaJiona/ and 
predicaJional sentences. On the approach that I present here, the distinction is one between sentences that 
relate two objects of the same type (cf. (32)) and sentences that predicate some property of an object If a 
DP that unambiguously denotes a predicate of individuals (e.g. the bee's knees, the em's pyjamas) appears in 
a sentence along with a DP that denotes an individual, that sentence does not have SPCCificational properties. 
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analysis of the copula, this follows in all cases from independent constraints on 
extraposition, and in most cases also from independent constraints on relativization. 
An important theme of the paper is that a cleft like (2a) and a copular sentence like 
(4) are identical in their properties, and any account that applies to one should apply to the 
other. The idea that clefts are copular sentences to which extraposition has applied dates 
back at least as far as Jespersen 1928. Early studies of clefts in generative grammar 
(Akmajian l970a,b), which also argued for a rule of extraposition in clefts, claimed that the 
properties of clefts and pseudoclefts were the same, and that this was an indication that the 
cleft was derived from the pseudocleft. I am making a very similar kind of argument here 
with regard to clefts and sentences containing definite descriptions. Indeed, it is possible to 
view this paper as reviving the important components of an analysis that has fallen out of 
favor, and showing that they ftt in nicely with current assumptions. At the same time, I am 
led to my proposal by an attempt to explain some basic facts that Akmajian did not attempt 
to explain.6 
I assume for the purposes of this paper that focus always appears on the head of a 
cleft7 
I. The presuppositions of clefts 
The first property of clefts requiring explanation has to do with the presuppositions that 
they carry. 
A. Existence presuppositions (Halvorsen 1978, Rooth 1995) 
A cleft of the form It is [a]F that has property n carries a presupposition 3x ll(x) (a 
presupposition that there is some individual that has property ll). As Rooth 1995 noticed, 
this presupposition cannot be attributed to focus on the head: parallel sentences of the form 
[a]F has property n don't exhibit the presupposition. For instance, while (5b) is an 
acceptable response to (Sa), (5c) is not The reason for the unacceptability of (Sc) is that 
the presupposition of (5c) conflicts with the assertion that (Sc) is making. No such 
conflict, however, exists in (Sb). 
(5) a. A: Who saw John? 
b. B: [NObody)p saw John. 
c. B':  * It's [NObody)p who saw John. 
presupposition of (c): someone saw John. 
Note that it isn't the presence of the quantifier itself that causes the unacceptability of (Sc): 
6Qn Akmajian's analysis, for instance, it seems to me an accident that interpretation works in such a way 
as to malte clefts (with the initial it) and the parallel sentences containing definite descriptions interpretively 
identical. It is worth noting that Akmajian considered a derivation of clefts from sentences containing 
definite descriptions - it is the first analysis entertained in Akmajian 1970a. He rejected this account on the 
basis of arguments that Higgins 1973/9, pp. 35 ff., later showed to be invalid. To be honest, I am giving 
shon shrift to facts that Akmajian did intend his final analysis to explain (see Section V). 
7This is not so obvious in examples such as (i) (discussed in Jespersen 1968 and reviewed in Halvorsen 
1978). 
(i) It is a poor heart that never rejoices. 
The existence of clefts without focus on the head may weaken the connection between clefts and inverse 
copular sentences - in part because inverse copular sentences routinely place focus on the postcopular 
argument Note, however, that, given extrapositions like the one that yields (ii), it is still plausible that (i) 
is derived by extraposition. 
(ii) That heart is a poor one that never rejoices. 
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(6) B": It's [nobody l know]F who saw John. 
One can of course duplicate these contrasts in object clefts: 
(7) a. A: Who did Mary see? 
b. B :  Mary saw [NObody]p. 
c. B ' :  •It's [NObody)p that Mary saw. 
presupposition of (c): Mary saw someone. 
(8) B":  It's [nobody l know]p that Mary saw. 
Other examples that support the idea that clefts induce a presupposition that mere 
focus does not are examples where, under operators like negation, the presupposition of 
the cleft remains. In (9b ), unlike in (9a), the presupposition of the cleft contradicts the 
assertion of the first clause. Likewise for the object clefts in (1 Oa,b ). 
(9) a. Since nobody saw John, it follows that [BILL]p didn't see John. 
b. #Since nobody saw John, it follows that it isn't [BILL]p who saw John. 
(10) a. Since Mary eviscerated nobody, it follows that Mary didn't eviscerate [BILL]p. 
b. #Since Mary eviscerated nobody, it follows that it isn't [BILL]p that Mary 
eviscerated. 
Roath's example is similar: 
( 1 1 )  Situation: "In my department. a football pool is held each week, where people bet 
on the outcomes of games. It is set up so that at most one person can win; if 
nobody wins, the prize money is carried over to the next week." (Rooth 1995) 
a. A: Did anyone win the football pool this week? · 
b. B: Probably not. because it's unlikely that [MAry]p won it, and she's the only 
person who ever wins. 
c. B' :  #Probably not, because it's unlikely that it's [MAry]p who won it, and she's 
the only person who ever wins. (Rooth 1995) 
presupposition of (c) :  someone won the football pool. 
B. Exhaustivity of focus in clefts (Halvorsen 1978, Rooth 1995) 
A cleft of the form It is [ CX]F that has property fl carries a requirement that 'r/x ll(x) -> 
x = a (a presupposition that only a has property ns). The result of this requirement is that 
clefts are incompatible with adverbs such as even and also (as noticed by Rooth) and 
appear redundant in combination with adverbs such as only. All these adverbs are 
normally compatible with focus, so the requirement is something special about the cleft 
The ability of adverbs like even, also and only to associate with focus is shown by 
(12): 
(12) a. It was even the case that [JOHN]p saw Mary. 
b. It was also the case that [JOHN]p saw Mary. 
c. It was only the case that [JOHN]p saw Mary. 
8The presupposition is actually more complicated lhan I atn pretending here - see Halvorsen 1978, pp. 1 3  
ff. for discussion. 
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The incompatibility of these adverbs with clefts is shown by (13): 
(13) a ?'! It was even the case that it was [JOHN)p who saw Mary. 
b. ?? It was also the case that it was [JOHN)p who saw Mary. 
c. ? It was only the case that it was [JOHN)p who saw Mary. 
341 
(14) shows that the problem with the examples in (13) is to be traced back to the semantics 
of the adverb. It is in general possible for adverbs to associate with the focus on a cleft 
head. 
(14) It was frequently the case that it was [JOHN]p who saw Mary. 
To see why the presupposition of the cleft renders the examples in (13) 
unacceptable, consider the semantics of the adverbs. 
(15) a It is even the case that p is true in w iff p is true and there is a q e C such that 
q is true in w and q ¢ p and q is less likely than p to be true (in w). (C is the set 
of alternatives to p.) 
b. It is also the case that p is true iff p is true in w and there is a q e C such that 
q is true in w and q ¢ p. (C is the set of alternatives to p.) 
c. It is only the case that p is true in w iff p is true in w and for all q e C, if q is 
true in w then q = p. (C is the set of alternatives to p.) 
Assume that focus evokes alternative propositions that are all of the form saw(Mary)(y) 
for some individual y. (Or perhaps for some group y of individuals,) Call the set of 
alternative propositions that focus evokes C. Now consider for instance (13a). For (13a) 
to be true, it must be the case that there is a q in C such that q ¢ p and q is true. In other 
words, it must be the case that there is some individual y such that y ¢ John and 
saw(Mary)(y) is true. But that contradicts the presupposition of ( 13a) that Vx 
saw(Mary)(x) -> x = John. Similar remarks apply in the cases of (13b) and (13c).9, to 
C. Solution 
The existence presupposition of clefts ((5)-(8)) is explained if a cleft of the form It is(n't) a 
that has property fi contains a concealed description the 0 that has property fi. This 
definite description has just the presupposition that the cleft exhibits.•• While it is known 
l�Nole that, in contrast to (13c), (i) seems perfectly fine. This is surprising, given that the unacceptability 
of (ii) and (iii) parallels the unacceptability of (13a) and (13b). 
(i) It was only JOHN who saw Mary. 
(ii) 77 It was even JOHN who saw Mary. 
(iii) ?? It was also JOHN who saw Mary. 
Why is this? Some directions that one could take are: to say that only permits a different inlerpretation in 
(i); to say that only in (i) is the adjectival only, displaced phonologically from a position where it modifies 
the null head of the definite description. In light of the contrast between the (a) and (b) examples in (iv), I 
would lilce to suggest that the solution lies in the way operators in conjoined DPs are inlerpreled, and that 
(i) is actually intetpreled as containing a conjunction like the one in (v b). 
(iv) a. 77It was [John as WELL)p who saw Mary. 
b. It was [Bill and John as WELL]p who saw Mary. 
(v) a. 77 It was [no one ELSE]p who saw Mary. 
b. It was [John and no one ELSE]p who saw Mary. 
1�at this is the right description is indicaled by the fact that when also or even is made to associale with a 
focus other than the one on the head of the cleft, the sentences improve. (Kai von Finlel, pc) 
(i) It is even the case that it was frequently John who saw MAry. I I  See Strawson 1950 for the view that definite descriptions carry presuppositions. 
5
Percus: Prying Open the Cleft
Published by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst, 1997
342 ORIN PERCUS 
that presuppositional requirements sometimes appear to vanish under operators like 
negation, it is also known that this does not happen under certain conditions. These 
conditions obtain when some constituent in the same clause as the presupposition carrier 
but not containing the presupposition carrier is in focus (Hajicova 1984). H the head of a 
cleft obligatorily receives focus, then these conditions are fulfilled, so it follows that the 
presuppositional requirement of the definite description will always survive under operators 
like negation, as in (9)-(1 1). 
ln other words, the pattern in (5)-(8) reduces to the pattern in (16). 
(16) a. ?? The one who saw John was [NObody]F. 
b. The one who saw John was [nobody 1 know]F. 
The exhaustivity of focus in clefts ({13)) is explained if a cleft of the form It is a 
that has property II contains a concealed description the 0 that has property II. The 
exhaustivity requirement is nothing other than the uniqueness requirement of this 
description. The pattern in (13)-(14), in other words, reduces to the pattern in (17). 
( 17) a. ?? It was even the case that the one who saw Mary was [JOHN] F. 
b. ?? It was also the case that the one who saw Mary was [JOHN]F. 
c. ? It was only the case that the one who saw Mary was [JOHN]F. 
(d. It was frequently the case that the one who saw Mary was [JOHN]F.) 
II. Other properties shared by sentences with definite descriptions 
The proposal that the syntax of the cleft contains a definite description accounts for a fair 
number of other properties that clefts share with copular sentences whose subjects contain a 
definite description. Here I show that an aspect of the interpretation of clefts that might 
otherwise be puzzling falls out naturally from the present analysis, and is utterly 
unsurprising when one recognizes that the same effect obtains in parallel sentences 
containing definite descriptions. I then point out, echoing arguments of Akmajian 1970a,b, 
that conditions on dependencies apply to clefts in exactly the same way that they do to 
parallel sentences containing definite descriptions. The way these conditions apply to clefts 
thus present no more of a puzzle than the way they apply to copular sentences with defmite 
subjects. 
A. Semantic partition effects 
The existence of a definite description in the basic structure of a cleft does more than get the 
presuppositions right. It has other interpretive effects as well. Consider first sentences like 
(18alb). (Glossing over details,) It is known that, when the structure in the overt syntax is 
as in (18a/b) - a structure containing an indefinite in subject position and an individual­
level predicate -- this structure is interpreted as being roughly equivalent to (19). This is 
true even when the indefmite is focused, as in (20). 
(18) a. A fireman is always intelligent. (Diesing 1992) 
b. It is always the case that a fueman is intelligent 
( 19) All firemen are intelligent 
(20) [A FIREman]F is always intelligent 
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(21) a. It is always [a FIREman]p who is intelligent. 
b. It is always the case that it's [a FIREman]p who is intelligent. 
343 
If there were no definite description in (21), then one might reasonably expect that the 
indefinite and the predicate might compose as they do in (1 8). But (21) does not yield an 
interpretation like (19). Rather, as expected, it yields the interpretation that (22) has. 
(22) It is always the case that the one who is intelligent is [a FIREman]p. 
Intelligent, in other words, is not interpreted as a predicate of which a fireman is the 
subject. Rather, intelligent is interpreted as the predicate in a relative clause that restricts a 
definite description, and a fireman is interpreted in the same way that the postcopular 
argument is in (22). This is predicted absolutely straigthforwardly on an analysis where 
(2lb) is derived from a sentence that is to all intents and purposes identical to (22). 
B. Conditions on anaphora and variable bindingl2 
The way conditions on anaphora and variable binding apply in clefts is somewhat 
mysterious. However, as shown below, it is no more mysterious than the way these 
conditions apply in the parallel copular sentences with definite descriptions as subjects. 
Once again, this is unsurprising on the current analysis. In general, the claim is that with 
all types of dependencies, conditions on dependencies will apply to clefts in the same way 
as they apply to the parallel sentences with definite descriptions and the head spelled out. If 
the way conditions on dependencies apply in these parallel sentences is understood, then 
one automatically understands the way they apply in the clefts. 
Comparison of the (a) and (b) examples below shows that conditions on anaphora 
and variable binding apply in exactly the same way in clefts and in sentences that are in all 
relevant respects identical to the sentences that I claim to be their sources. The (c) 
examples are parallel sentences where an element that corresponds to the cleft head 
composes in the normal way with material that corresponds to the clefted material, and the 
(d) examples are parallel sentences where an element that corresponds to the cleft head 
appears after the copula in a pseudocleft. The examples in (24) are significant in that they 
show that at least one condition in anaphora applies differently in these latter sorts of 
sentences. (26) shows that clefts exhibit weak crossover effects that parallel the effects in 
copular sentences with definite subjects. 
(23) Apparent satisfaction of Condition A in the absence of c-command 
a. It was [herSELFi]p that Mary saw first. 
b. The one that Mary saw first was [herSELFi]p 
c. Mary saw [herSELFi]p first. 
d. What Maryi saw first was [herSELFi]p. 
(24) a. ?It was [himSELFi]p that John wanted Mary to describe. (after Akmajian 1970b, 
p. 125) 
b. ?The one that John wanted Mary to describe was [himSELFi]p. 
c. * John wanted Mary to describe [himSELFi]p 
d. ??What John wanted Mary to describe was [himSELFi]p 
12The phenomena discussed here form a subclass of connectedness phenomena, in the terms of Akmajian 
1970a,b and Higgins 1973. 
7
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(25) Apparent variable binding in the absence of c-comrnand 
a. It was [his MOther)p that every boy saw first 
b. The person that every boy saw fust was [his MOther)p. 
c. Every boy saw [his MOther]p first 
d. What every boy saw firSt was [his MOther]p 
(26) Crossover effects 
a. ?'! It was every boy's [MOther]p that he saw first 
b. ?'! The person he saw fJist was every boy's [MOther]p. 
(weak) 
c. * He saw every boy's [MOther]p fust 
d. * What he saw firSt was every boy's [MOther]p. 
(strong) 
C. Conditions on NPi licensing 
As shown in the (a) and (b) examples in (27)-(28), negative polarity expressions in the 
head of a cleft are licensed by matrix negation but cannot be licensed by embedded 
negation. By contrast, negative polarity expressions outside the head of the cleft are 
licensed by embedded negation and cannot be licensed by matrix negation. The paradigm 
follows naturally if at the point when negative polarity licensing takes place, the clefts have 
structures identical to those of the sentences sketched in the primed examples.13 
(27) a. It isn't [anyone I KNOW]p that John saw. 
b. *It is [anyone I KNOW)p that John didn't see. 
a' . The one that John saw isn't anyone I know. 
b'. *The one that John didn't see is anyone I know. 
(28) a. *It wasn't [JOHN]p who did anything to help. 
b. It was [JOHN)p who didn't do anything to help. 
a'. *The one who did anything to help wasn't John. 
b'. The one who didn't do anything to help was John. 
It is instructive to compare these examples to similar cases involving pseudoclefts. 
The pseudocleft (29b) can be taken to show that the point at which negative polarity 
licensing is determined is a point at which some operations must have altered the surface 
representation. (27b) shows that it cannot be that, at that later point, the head of the cleft 
appears below the embedded negation. 
(29) a. What John saw wasn't [anything I might REcognize)p. 
b. What John didn't see was [anything I might REcognize]p. ) 
13It is probably worth noting that the NPI facts argue that, if the cleft contains a definite desaiption of the 
sort that I envision in a copular sentence, that definite description must correspond to the precopular DP 
rather than the postcopular DP. This is clear from the contrast between (27a) and (i): 
(i) • [Anyone I KNOWJp isn't the one that John saw. 
8
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Ill. The specificational character of clefts 
The last property of clefts that my analysis seeks to explain has to do with a particular 
constraint on the interpretation of clefts. There is a certain discourse function that the head 
of a cleft is barred from engaging in. 
A. Restrictions on the role of the head of a cleft 
If we consider copular sentences that relate two DPs, in responses to questions like the 
ones in (30) and (3 1), we can talk about the DPs as having two different functions. The 
two appear· to differ with respect to their role in the discourse. In the case of one 
description (Bill, the guy on the left), the participants in the conversation appear to assume 
that there is a single individual that satisfies the description and that both parties to the 
conversation can identify that individual. Call this description Dt (which could stand for 
known). In the case of the other description (the President of the U.S.), it appears to be 
taken for granted that, if there is a single individual that satisfies the description, it is not 
established which individual that is before the sentence is uttered. Call this description Du 
(which could stand for unknown, or up for grabs). In the non-cleft responses below, � 
appears before the copula and 00 appears after the copula. The cleft responses show that a 
00 description cannot appear as the head of the cleft.14, ts 
(30) Situation: Two guys are standing in front of us, Bill and Bob. 
a. Q: Who do you think is the President of the United States? 
b. A: I think [BILL]F is the President of the United States. 
� Du 
c. A: I think it's [BILL]F who is the President of the United States. 
Dk Du 
(31) a. Q: Who do you think Bill is? 
b. A: I think Bill is [the President of the United STATES]f. 
Dk Du 
c. A: 7? I think it's [the President of the United STATES]F who(/that) Bill is. 
B. A solution 
Du Dk 
14 Akmajian 1970b speaks ofDu as introducing a "semantic variable" whose value is specified by Dk. A 
conjecture as to what this means is that copular sentences relating two DPs always respond to a question Who is Du? (3lb), however, suggests that this is true only of a subset of these copular sentences (to which 
clefts belong). IS It is worth noting that the unacceptability of (31c) seems to mirror the unacceptability of the inverted 
answer ill (i) (cf. the acceptability of the invened answer ill (ii). 
(i) (Same siiUation as (30)-(31)) 
a. Q: Who do you think Bill is? 
b. A: • I think [the President of the United STA TES]F is Bill. 
Du Dk 
(ii) a. Q: Who do you think is the President of the United States? 
b. A: I think the President of the United States Is [Bn.L)f. 
Du Dk 
If one takes this to be significant, it might lead one to seek an alternative explanation to the one I entertain 
below. On such an ellplanation, both (31c) and (ib) would be ruled out by a principle that is sufficiently 
sensitive to surface representations that it treats the two alike. (It seems to me that such an ellplanation 
would be completely consistent with every other aspect of this paper.) Noam Chomsky (pc) pointed out 
the plausibility of this alternative route. 
9
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I will assume that the verb to be, when it relates two definite descriptions, has the 
following properties: (i) it selects two arguments of the type of individuals; (ii) it requires 
that one of its syntactic arguments be a Du.J6 17 The details that are needed to make sense of 
this are given in (32), but are not directly relevant to the discussion that follows.18 I 
assume a system like that of Heim 1982, under which definite and indefinite descriptions 
denote open propositions. Since to be selects for individuals, this means that at the level of 
linguistic representation that is interpreted, any such description generated as a syntactic 
argument of to be will have to have raised, leaving behind an individual variable. A 
sentence like the one in (33a) will thus have the logical form in (33b) and be interpreted as 
the conjunction of two propositions. 
(32) a. be(x)(y) is true iff y = x 
b. be(x)(y) is defmed only if there is no individual a such that the context entails 
that x = a  





Given this assumption, it is not hard to see that the analysis of clefts endorsed here 
will result in the unacceptability of sentences like (3lc). If the copula relates individuals, 
then the null head in the hypothesized source for the cleft will presumably be a predicate of 
individuals that is true of all individuals, and for the case in (3 lc) no different from one. 
On the approach that I have suggested, where clefts contain definite descriptions, it is clear 
that whatever renders (34) unacceptable will also render (3lc) unacceptable. (As with the 
discussion of conditions on anaphora, this is not a full explanation, but rather a reduction to 
something that must independently be explained.) 
(34) ?? The one who(lthat) Bill is 
D��: 
16-Jbe assumption that the copula relates two individuals is a simplification for the purposes of this paper. 
The existence of clefts whose heads are something other than DPs suggests that the copula may merely 
require that its two arguments be of the same type. 
(i) It was every IRish book that John read. (Higginbotham 1987) 
(ii) It was in SPAIN that I lost my wallet. 
17The assumption that there is any such copula may be controversial. However, if one accepts the 
Moro/Heycock arguments for inversion in copular sentences (see the discussion below), it is clear that there 
must be one copula that relates two individuals and allows inversion as well as one copula that relates an 
individual and a predicate and does not allow inversion. DPs that are unambiguously predicates do not 
invert: 
(i) a. • The greatest/ a disgrace to the nation was sitting next to me on the subway. 
b. Q: Who is the greatest (/ a disgrace to the nation) ? 
A: • The greatest/ a disgrace to the nation is JOHN. 
(cf. 
(ii) a. The president of the U.S. was sitting next to me on the subway. 
b. Q: Who is the President of the U.S. '! 
A: The President of the U.S. is JOHN. ) 
Moreover, Carnie 1995 presents Irish data that suggest that there are cases where natural language represents 
these two instances of to be differently. 
18I should mention with regard to (32) that I take contexts to be sets of assignments of values to variables, 
or possibly sets of world-assignment pairs as on Heim 1982, 1983. 
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Similarly, clefts that contain defmite descriptions parallel to the ones in (35a,b) will be 
unacceptable. This is correct, as shown in (36a,b). 
(35) a. ?'! The one who is Bill 
Dt 
b. ?'! The one who the President is 
Du 
(36) a. '!? It is [the President of the U.S.]p who is Bill. 
Du Dt 
b. '!? It is [BILL]p who the President is. 
Dt Du 
C. A more general solution 
However, there is something more to be said. 'The derivation of clefts I have 
suggested predicts that all clefts that correspond to copular sentences in which there is an 
ill-fanned definite description will be ill-fonned, and among these are sentences in which 
the head of the cleft corresponds to a Du. But there are still sentences that this derivation 
allows in which the head of a cleft corresponds to a Du. and these are unacceptable as well. 
Here is an example: 
(37) a. Q: Who do you think the guy (who's) on the left is? 
Dt 
b. A: I think the guy (who's) on the left is [the President of the United STATES]p. 
Dt Du 
Since there is nothing wrong with (37b}, presumably there is also nothing wrong with the 
structure in (38). 
(38) I think the 0 who's on the left is [the President of the United STATES)p. 
But from (38) one should be able to derive (39}, which is clearly not an acceptable answer: 
(39) ?7 I think it's [the President of the United STATES]p who's on the left 
Du Dt 
The solution I suggest here is that from (38) one cannot derive (39), and that this 
follows from general constraints on extraposition. More specifically, the unacceptability of 
(39) is the product of two generalizations: (i} In a copular construction with two DP 
arguments, Dt arguments are base subjects; (ii) base subjects do not allow extraposition. 
The first generalization is due to Moro 1990; the second is a rephrasing of a conclusion 
from Johnson 1985.19 
The evidence that Dk arguments are base subjects comes from Moro 1990 (see also 
Heycock 1991}, who shows that there is an extraction asymmetry between the two DPs 
that a copula relates. A postcopular Du argument can be extracted from, while a 
postcopular Ok argument cannot, as can be seen by considering the sentence in (40). The 
conclusion is that Ok arguments are base subjects (say the subject of a small clause20), that 
1�ere is an alternate line in the literature that might predict the impossibility of extraposition in (38): 
Tunstall 1994 argues that only nonreferential DPs, a class of DPs that presumably excludes Dts. can be 
extraposed from. See also Erteschik-Shir 1973 for referential conditions on extraction. 
lOifMoro and Heycock are correct in saying that the copula selects a small clause, then the element written 
be in (32)-(33) should be interpreted not as the copula, but rather as a phonologically nuU predicate in the 
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the surface postcopular position is their base position and that extraction from this position 
is blocked by Subject Condition/ CEO, and that Du arguments (generated in the small clause 
below the Dk argument ) may raise to become overt subjects. 
(40) Who do you think the President of the U.S. is the father of ? 
Situation: There is a party for dignitaries and their children. 
Condition 1: Speaker and addressee can identify the President of the U.S. but, 
looking at all the younger guests, the speaker can't figure out which is the 
President's daughter. (precopular argument is Dk. postcopular argument is Du) 
#Condition 2: Speaker and addressee see the dignitaries and their children walking 
in arm in arm, and can tell who is the father of who. But the speaker has no idea 
which dignitary is the President (precopular argument is Du, postcopular argument 
is Dk) 
Evidence that base subjects do not allow extraposition - something I treat simply as an 
unexplained generalization here (but see Johnson 1985 for a theory) -- is provided by the 
contrasts in (41). Subjects of unaccusatives and passives allow extraposition, while 
subjects of transitives do not21,22 
(41) a. A man arrived yesterday who was wearing a yellow hat 
b. A man was arrested yesterday who was wearing a yellow hat 
c. * A man insulted me yesterday who was wearing a yellow hat 
If � arguments are base subjects and base subjects do not allow extraposition, then 
the defmite description in the source for a cleft will never be a �  argument Consequently, 
in all clefts that derive from copular sentences relating a � and a Du description, the � 
will be the head of the cleft 
IV. Independent motivation for the spell-out rule 
The derivation of clefts that I have proposed relies on the spell-out rule in (42). Here I 
suggest that the rule is not one that need be invoked especially for the purpose of 
accounting for clefts. There is a use for it elsewhere in the grammar. Clausal subjects, I 
suggest, are definite descriptions, and extraposition from a clausal subject triggers the 
spell-out rule. 
(42) [+<let] 0 tCP --> it 
McCloskey 1991 shows that, in the presence of conjoined clausal subjects, there is 
a semantic condition on agreement As shown in (43), in cases where the two conjoined 
small clause. Alternatively, one could give up the small clause analysis, and say that the copula selects 
both arguments nonnally, the OJ,: argument as its specifier, but raises above its specifier position at least 
whenever the Du argument raises. Either option will do for my purposes here. 
21Simply with regard to the nature of the descriptive generalization. it is worth noting that there is no seose 
in which raising alone licenses extraposition, as the contrasts remain in sentences like those in (i): 
(i) a. ? A man seemed to him to have entered yesterday who was wearing a yellow hat 
b. ? A man seemed to him to have been arrested yesterday who was wearing a yellow hat. 
c. • A man seemed to him to have insulted me who was wearing a yellow hat. 
22-fhe data are aclllally considerably more complicated than I am pretending here: monadic unergatives seem 
to allow extraposition in "presentational" contexts. See Johnson 198S for relevant discussion. 
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propositions are contradictory or incompatible, plural agreement seems to be required. 
Plural agreement is not required otherwise ((44)). 
(43) a. #  That I am right and that I am wrong has been claimed 
b. That I am right and that I am wrong have (both) been claimed. 
(44) That the shares are overvalued and that a decline is in order is widely believed on 
Wall Street ( = (12), McCloskey 1991) 
If we accept that clausal subjects are definite descriptions, then we can get a handle 
on these facts. Specifically, assume (45a) and (45b). 
(45) a. Clausal subjects are DPs, defmites with a null head23. 
b. Both DPs and CPs can be conjoined. 
Conjoined clausal subjects exhibit singular agreement when they are made up of a single 
subject DP whose restrictor consists of two conjoined CPs. They exhibit plural agreement 
when they are made up of a conjunction of DPs, each with its own CP restrictor -- and 
also, I will assume, when they are made up of a single subject DP with a plural null head 
and a conjoined CP restrictor. This means that the sentences in (43a) and (43b) have the 
structures in (47) and (48) respectively (with paraphrases in the primed examples). 
( 47) a. [op [ +def] 0[ +sg] [cp [cp that I am right) and [ep that I am wrong ] )  ] has been 
claimed. 
a'. The allegation that I .am right and that I am wrong has been made. 
( 48) a. [op [op [ +def] 0 that I am right 1 and [op [ +def] 0 that I am wrong ) 1 have 
(both) been claimed. 
a.' The allegation that I am right and the allegation that I am wrong have (both) been 
made. 
b. [op [+def] O[+pl) [cp [ep that I am right] and [cp that I am wrong 1 )  ] have 
(both) been claimed. 
b'. The allegations that I am right and that I am wrong have (both) been made. 
The singular agreement in (43a/47a) indicates the presence of a singular DP with conjoined 
CP restrictors, and such a DP is interpreted as a contradictory proposition. In most cases, 
a sentence with a subject denoting a contradictory proposition is simply not what the 
speaker wishes to convey. Though (49) makes clear that, in cases where it is what the 
speaker wishes to convey, singular agreement is possible. 
( 49) People here keep claiming contradictory things. Would you believe it? [That I am 
right and that I am WRONG]F has been claimed. 
If clausal subjects are definite descriptions, then it seems plausible that expletive­
associate constructions like the ones in (50) result from the extraposition of a (possibly 
conjoined) CP restrictor and the application of (42). 
23In other words, I take the CP in a clausal subject to be a predicate of propositions (or at any rate of things 
like claims and beliefs); the null head Is a predicate that is interpreted as conjoined with this predicate. 
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(50) a It is widely believed on Wall Street that the shares are overvalued. 
b. It is widely believed on Wall Street that the shares are overvalued and that a 
decline is in order. 
V. Some Remaining Issues 
A. Agreement and the nuU head 
It would be wrong to conclude without mentioning a problem that the previous discussion 
in particular brings into sharp relief. Simply put, the problem is that the it in extraposition 
constructions triggers singular agreement 24 
Consider expletive-associate constructions in which the associate contains two 
incompatible propositions: 
(5 1) a It has been claimed (both) that I am right and that I am wrong. 
b. It seems equally likely at this point that the president will be re-elected and that he 
will be impeached. (= (15), McCloskey 1991) 
On the approach that I just outlined, because expletive-associate constructions are created 
by extraposition of a CP, the conjunction in the associate must be a CP conjunction. 
Because the conjunction in the associate involves two incompatible propositions, the null 
head in the clausal subject must be plural. But if the null head is plural, why is there 
singular agreement in (51) ? 
Exactly the same problem arises with clefts. Consider a sentence like (52). 
(52) It is [John and MAry]F who are the guilty ones. 
On the approach here, the CP { cp whoi liP tj are the guilty ones] ] restricts a null head that 
presumably (like overt nouns in such constructions) must be marked as plural. But if the 
null head is plural, why is there singular agreement? 
There are different routes that one could take to explain how it comes about that the 
it in extraposition constructions has agreement properties. I will leave the problem open. It 
is worth noting, however, that the existence of the null head has been only of expository 
use in the account I have presented. It is not necessary and adds nothing to the 
interpretation of the DP in which it appears. At the same time, it is the null head that 
determines the agreement properties of the DP. So one might well wonder whether there is 
a null head there after all. 
B. The nature of the spell-out rule 
Finally, although I have formulated the spell-out rule ((42)) as referring explicitly to the 
trace of a CP, it could well be that its actual character is more general. It might be a spell­
out rule for definite DPs (or Ds) that applies at an appropriately late point in the spell-out 
process. 
It is convenient to close with a spell-out rule that looks at a DP and decides that 
that's it. 
24McCloskey 1991 discusses the agreement facts in expletive·associate constructions; Akmajian 1970a.b 
discusses the agreement facts in cleft constructions and concludes from them that clefts are derived from 
pseudo-clefts. 
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